now lets address the list directly:
my core complaint is that these are just a bundling of independently fine tendencies, but i think it's counterproductive to lump them together.
1. identity, and the primary thing i am skeptical of
2. true but uninteresting (we agree)
3. queerness - basically an implication of 2 not working, and unclear why significant
4. tbh just kinda silly. radfem is kinda dead end
5. feminism. well and good, but unclear why relevant
i see 1-3 as stemming from the same thing: rejection of sexual hegemony
and 4-5 as simply feminist analysis
(4 masquerades as prescription, but we all know when we get into defining capital M Men, it just lapses back into feminist analysis)
and with 1-3, i'm not sure why we turn rejection into an identity. here's a very short piece that i find insightful and think might be helpful (you haven't read lacan, but you've read stirner, so you'll be mostly fine)
here's a passage i've been thinking about, but mostly for its inapplicability. you say your use of the term is idiosyncratic, and ofc i agree, but i don't think your motivations are idiosyncratic, or detached/isolated at all, and are fairly definite, consistent, and are continuously situated
the opposite in fact - they are consequences of other very dearly held positions (see above). however, rather than clarifying anything, i think the subsumption obfuscates the value and truth in those particularistic analyses
motivational contexts come prior to rationality, and imo your motivations are overdetermined, and the conditionally applied rationality is unnecessary, and i would argue a hinderance on both your analysis and your orientation in the world