Alt Text

Show parent replies
one of the many reasons i enjoy wittgenstein is that he articulates one elaboration of hegel's dictum: "philosophy arises when life has lost its unity" www.marxists.org/reference/ar...
among others, marx, nietzche, and dewey also traverse this path to some extent, with dewey being highly relevant for W in my mind. i wouldn't go as far as to say that "our language is in order as it is", but for the problematic situation W found himself in, i think it's an apt response.

(W definitely oversteps, but if anyone can, adorno ought to be able to appreciate the value of exaggeration in philosophizing)
for the uninitiated: "Dewey held that serious thought is relative to a concrete problematic situation. If the situation is not problematic, inquiry is otiose. Much of traditional philosophy, he thought, consisted in the generation of pseudo-questions which arose because of
an inadequate appreciation of the way in which terms, concepts, and theories were related to the concrete situations in which they originated" - Raymond Geuss, History and Illusion in Politics, pg 158.
one aspect of all of those that attempt such strategies is that they are reflexive theories, trying to give an account of what philosophy is doing and how their philosophizing fits into that picture
also i could certainly see a rejoinder that the context is already circumscribed here such that the dichotomization is appropriate, to which i'd basically accept, but at that point we aren't really disagreeing anymore.
basically i want to ascribe a negative thesis to wittgenstein, where he says to his philosopher-peers: "don't think about it that way, you're confusing yourself", that the scope of his notion of philosophy is tied to his historical context, and that he has ~nothing to say about other philosophies