Alt Text

HomeTimelineSearch
Show parent replies
willow
raymond geuss, history and illusion in politics, pg 79-80. liberalism and toleration Relatively fancy efforts to distinguish between neutrality of outcomes (not always possible) and neutrality of reasons cited for action (possible),° seem pointless. Any seriously religious person will reject the very idea of neutral reasons. There are two distinct points here. First, there is the question whether there ever are any 'neutral' reasons, particularly in matters that concern one's basic world-view. Second, even if there were neutral reasons in some arcas, it might be inappropriate in areas of the gratest human concern to allow oneself to be moved by reasons that are neutral. For a seriously religious person it might seem that to accept the possibility of neutrality on issues of the greatest human concern is to decide to deprive oneself of the most important human good, the possibility of leading a life which is preemptively pervaded by religious truth. As a secularist and atheist I would myself welcome the demise of this kind of religious view, but I do not delude myself, as many liberals seem to do, into thinking I have 'neutral' grounds on which to object to it. To say to a non-liberal that one ought' to look for and accept neutral reasons is just to say that one ought to be a liberal, and if that is what one thinks (and can get one's opponent to accept) then there is no need for a detour through a theory of neutral reasons. It is no surprise that onc can give good liberal reasons for holding the views one holds in a liberal way (i.e. on purportedly 'neutral' grounds). An opponent who will not accept liberalism on other grounds will be likely to accept the doctrine of neutrality in any form.
willow
for a variation of purple see:

This is a post by another user.

View in bsky.app