Timeline - Media (page 6)

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@dreary.bsky.socialJul 16, 2025

honestly this is exactly what i was advocating for so i’m happy

client-appview-debate with kasey
(two dumb gringas x is fortnite actually overrated crossover event)

literally me

new favorite soundbite

i thought it was pretty cute when i found it

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alice robertsJul 11, 2025

hahahaha

:/mnt/Archive/.inactive/Me/discord/2025-06-20$ grep 'goreshit' -r .
./Messages/c691151055316058183/messages.json:{"ID": 968363984816308254, "Timestamp": "2022-04-26 04:12:45", "Contents": "Ewww goreshit not good", "Attachments": ""},
:/mnt/Archive/.inactive/Me/discord/2025-06-20$

alice robertsJul 11, 2025

*Juliet 15/254
willow
hello juliet - clarion
https://youtu.be/yfgfYfS4XBo

something like that

wagie wife moment

jreg 🤝 jessica fern

getting some sun

slowly working on it

i could take some new ones if it would help

northernlion, welcome to the resistance

alice robertsJul 10, 2025

let’s sift through the static to find a simpler sound

And there's a microphone
Picking every word up And it shuts itself off
When it's sure that it's heard enough

The quiet can scrape
All the calm from your bones
But maybe it should
Maybe we need to be hollowed
To get up and grow And stop fucking around

kevin devine - cotton crush

@dreary.bsky.socialJul 9, 2025

😭

willowJul 9, 2025

y’all think i’m joking but even when i was barely reading this happened plenty (check out penny’s profile in the replies)

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willowJul 9, 2025

well he thinks he’s doing adorno journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/...

have to go hungry anymore or be homeless. Still, millions live in misery, which creates a strong apologetic necessity to justify suffering that could be prevented. Following my analysis, this justification will not only be sustained by false claims about the unchangeability of this world and a curtailment of our imaginative powers, but also with the moralistic
instrumentalisation of moral ideas. To criticise the latter, moral convictions are essential. Only on the basis of a moral anti-moralism can we detect how ideological distortions turn ideas of the good and just into a 'cover of evil' (Adorno, 2000 [1963]:
171; trans. amended). A dialectical critique of the 'unreason of the dominant reason' (Adorno, 1998 [1962]: 151) has always been a central ambition of the ideology critique of the Frankfurt School, and it is being neglected by contemporary realists who draw on this tradition (see Forst, 2023; Honneth,

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willowJul 9, 2025

nice samesies

https://www.idrlabs.com/jock-nerd-prep-goth/test.php
idr labs
Jock-Nerd/Prep-Goth Test
Result:
You are 82.7% Goth, 23.6% Nerd, placing you in the True Goth category.

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alice robertsJul 9, 2025

broke: soundcloud app broker: mobile browser with no loop ability brokest: request desktop site

daylily cover with infinite loop on and a fucked up viewport
https://soundcloud.com/killaud/daylily-cover

1 replies

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willowJul 8, 2025

oh wait beabadoobee already did this one

[Chorus]
She plays bass, she plays bass
Nothing matters 'cause we're both in space
Pretty sure we could never date
She plays bass, she plays bass

beabadoobee - she plays bass lyrics

alice robertsJul 8, 2025

And when you realize it's a pattern And not a phase
It's what you've become And it's what you will stay
That's ballgame

kevin devine - ballgame

willowMar 1, 2025

our real opinion is not one in which we have never wavered, but the one to which we have most regularly returned.

1 replies

willowJul 8, 2025

idk what’s going on but from: searches haven’t been working on alice roberts for a few days

1 replies

willowJul 8, 2025

via

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@dreary.bsky.socialJul 7, 2025

also we were there for the last supper but didn’t chat bc it was crowded

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willowJul 7, 2025

they’re calling it the straightest fagslop of all time

Kingyoya-san no Karisome Fuufu (also chapter 12)

!? nana-san!?
[panel showing car passing close by with “vroom”]
that was very dangerous
sorry…

This is a post by another user.

View in bsky.app

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willowJul 5, 2025

alt text backfill (i was right but wow is it hard to watch, thanks for the patience jonas)

it’s always two dumb gringas telling each other “exactlyyyy”

couple watching CodeAesthetic’s “premature optimization”
https://youtu.be/tKbV6BpH-C8

willowJun 27, 2025

i should be vocally wrong about things more often, the embarrassment is much better than being perpetually silently stupid

this reminds me of something u might like

soundcloud top plays for leaking by bomber (twiki)
https://soundcloud.com/bomberisdead/018-leaking

willow 666 plays (i lied actually actually it's 661 rn but i thought 666 would be a cooler screenshot, dw i listened to it 5 more times, i just can't wait 24 hours)

flip of lil tjay - leaked
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LT9fj89qKdU

willowOct 11, 2024

my goat

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@dreary.bsky.socialJul 5, 2025

it's been messy lately

willow lists: kasey, comfy, meow, meow1, meow2, meow3, meow4, meow5

this is a side thing but i do think it's cute how the only other time guess uses "powerful fantasies" is when he's talking about rorty's murderous father in the same work. i'd like to think this was intentional

raymond geuss, politics and the imagination, richard rorty at princeton, 159

As the years went by, and we both left Princeton, I am afraid the incipient intellectual and emotional gulf between us got wider, especially after what I saw as Dick’s turn toward ultra-nationalism with the publication of Constructing Our Country. Dick had always been and remained to the end of his life a “liberal” (in the American sense, i.e., a “Social Democrat”): a defender of civil liberties and of the extension of a full set of civic rights to all, a vocal supporter of the labor unions and of programs to improve the conditions of the poor, an enemy of racism, cruelty, arbitrary authority, and social exclusion. On the other hand, I found that he also enjoyed a spot of jokey leftist-baiting when he thought I was adopting knee-jerk positions which he held to be ill-founded. That was all fair enough. I tried not to rise to the bait, and usually succeeded, but this did not contribute to making our relation easier or more comfortable for me. The high (or low, depending on one’s perspective) point of this sort of thing occurred sometime in the 1980s when Dick sent me a postcard from Israel telling me he had just been talking with the Israeli official responsible for organizing targeted assassinations of Arab mayors on the West Bank. He closed by saying he thought this was just what the situation required. I often wondered whether in acting in this provocative way he was treating me as he would have liked to have treated his father, a well-known poet and man of the (relatively) hard Left, who eventually, as Dick put it, “became prey to very powerful fantasies on which he was perfectly willing to act”; Dick had to have him institutionalized after some potentially murderous outbreak. Probably by wondering about this I was trying to convince myself that I had an importance in Dick’s imagination that I surely did not have.

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willowJul 5, 2025

like he's constantly granting things geuss but then being a silly guy about rejecting him. why *this* "because"? of course you're right that the facts do not speak for themselves, and motivations are important, but we can arrive at that evaluation in plenty of ways

amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 11

One might suppose, as Geuss (2001) writes, that the participation in bourgeois society causes us to adopt viewpoints from which it is difficult if not impossible to appreciate ‘the virtues of classless society’ (77). Perhaps. Yet all critical bite is lost without the further thought that the liberation from class society is a goal worth recognising and striving for because it would serve the interests of a vast majority of people.

willowAug 27, 2024

sources of normatively are abundant, diffuse, extraordinarily varied in scope and density and thickness, and generally not all that exciting (while simultaneously being the rather significant!). evaluative normativity can be very minimal, and conflating it with morality is a recipe for confusion.

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willowJul 5, 2025

like this is a fine tension to bring up, but it's also more or less addressed head on by your citation. then again, i'm not too mad about this one because i think the frequency with which the catchphrase is thrown around to be a little off-putting and misleading,

amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

I surmise that the best response for realists would be to stress that they do not deny that a division of labour between moral and epistemic criticisms of ideologies in political theory can be worthwhile and productive (see Aytaç and Rossi, 2023: 1225–1226). Yet this amounts to admitting crucial limits of their approach. This concession sits uneasily with their frequent assertion that the elision of moral ideas is a desirable feature of ideology critique, which is rooted in the sympathies radical realists have for the strong thesis that moral norms tend to be ‘dead politics’, as Geuss (2010) has phrased it: ‘the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future’ (111). Is the point, perhaps, that some prefigurative struggles can escape this grip? How exactly? These are fascinating questions, but reflections on them require the fuel of moral argument to get anywhere at all.

geuss, politics and the imagination, moralism and realpolitik, 42

Ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Our past is an essential part of what we are, which we ignore at our peril. We could not completely leave it behind even if we wished to do so; but recognition of this necessity gives us no reason to romanticize it. Nothing stops us from making our own moral judgments on our past, on our present way of life, or, proleptically, on future action or its probable outcome, although the further away from present contexts of action we get, the less of a grip our apparatus of moral reflection will give us on the situations we encounter. One should not, however, confuse trying to refine our moral categories with trying to understand what is going on in the world in which we live. There is nothing wrong with cultivating our own moral intuitions, but for them to have any value they must be minimally connected with the cognitive apparatus by which we track the world as it is. There is certainly no guarantee that the fi t between these intuitions, which we in any case have reason to believe are historically highly variable, and the way the world is, will always be smooth and comfortable,so it would behoove us to be on our guard against trusting them too blindly

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willowJul 5, 2025

and geuss is less than exactly clear in the passage, stressing the dichotomy too much. i didn't like the aytaç and rossi paper very much for this as well iirc. in any case, if you want geuss' actual view, just ctrl+f for "subordinate"

raymond geuss, morality, culture, and history, 6

Habermas is right to emphasize the importance of 'rank' and 'rank-ordering' in Nietzsche. Nietzsche is a conscious radical anti-egalitarian not just in politics but also in ethics. He explicitly rejects the view that there should be one morality for everyone (JGB §§ 198, 43, 30) . In fact he even holds that it is 'immoral' to apply the principle 'What is fair for one person, is fair for another' (JGB §221). Morality is to be subordinated to the principle of rank-ordering (JGB §§22 1, 219, 228, 257). Habermas is wrong, however, to connect this line of argument with a purported greater nobility of that which is older or more aboriginal.

raymond geuss, history and illusion in politics, 154

On the classic Marxist construction, it is not rational for those who are impoverished and oppressed to want universal tolerance and consensus-based reform rather than violent revolutionary change. Marx's economic analysis may have signal defects and he may have incorrectly identified the major class of oppressed people as 'the international proletariat', but his account of the specious logic of resistance to oppression retains its plausibility. Those who live in wealthy societies with a framework of robust institutions and strong liberal traditions can spend their time discussing the parish-pump politics that take place within that framework and the fine-tuning of the system of individual rights, but the framework is not in place everywhere in the world, and there is no reason to believe it will become universal in the foreseeable future. Even if one had no aspiration beyond that of extending the liberal system into new areas of the world, that would seem to require an ability to take a step back from it and see it in a slightly larger theoretical and empirical context. Such a wider context would be one in which the concept of a 'right' was to play a very derivative and subordinate role.

raymond geuss, outside ethics, 59

I have claimed that the main line of philosophic writing in nineteenth century Central Europe rejects the received modern consensus, and tries to orient thinking about human life and action around a very different set of questions from the ones that preoccupy contemporary ethics. Continental philosophers reject either one or the other (or both) of the two pillars of contemporary ethics. As far as the first pillar is concerned, they take one or another of a variety of weaker or stronger views. Thus, they cast doubt on the centrality of the ethical question, holding the weaker view that knowing “What ought I to do?” is of distinctly subordinate importance in practical life, or that it is not a philosophically significant question. Alternatively, they hold the stronger view that it is actually a deep mistake or a failing to ask that question (at any rate, as a philosophical question).

geuss, philosophy and real politics, 86

Nothing in this book should be taken to imply that no one should ever allow normative considerations of any kind to play any role whatever in deciding how to act politically. After all, even “efficiency” is a kind of normative concept. Equally I have given no reason to think that all moral considerations must be absolutely excluded from politics. Individuals or groups can cultivate their ethical intuitions and exercise their capacities for moral approval or disapproval ad libitum, as long as they do not confuse that with attaining any understanding whatever of the world in which they live, or think that their (clarified) moral intuitions have some special standing as completely adequate guides to political action. Finally, I have no objection to the view that “justice” (in whatever sense) or certain forms of “equality” are political desiderata (among others), as long as this is not construed as an abstract, blanket commitment that overrides all others, and provided particular reasons are given for thinking equality is desirable in some concrete situation. Considerations of fairness, equality, justice, and other virtues might well have a perfectly dignifed, if subordinate, place in various administrative decisions. What I do object to is the claim that they define politics. One result of taking seriously the reflections presented in this book would be that we would give up approaching politics in general by trying, necessarily unsuccessfully, to blank out history, and we would also give up focusing our thinking exclusively on the set of highly peculiar and historically contingent intuitions about “justice” that we happen to and in one contemporary society.

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willowJul 5, 2025

how is this possibly your read! "without any coercion"?? "work out freely"?? why are u like this sob. within your own cited passage he refutes your attribution. like cmon bro we've all read foucault how are you still on this shit

amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

This brings me to a third challenge. It again begins with the question of why it matters that people can work out freely how to structure their social and political lives without getting, as Geuss (2010) frames it, ‘caught up in the web of powerful fantasies which our society spins around us’ (x). Human beings should not be subjected, as this seems to imply, to fabricated realities, but should be lifted to a position from which they can make up their minds, without any coercion, about how society does and can work.

raymond geuss, politics and the imagination, preface, x

Most of the beliefs, attitudes, desires, and values we hold, after all, we have acquired in social contexts in response to individual and institutional forces and pressures of various kinds. There is every reason to believe that I (and we) share the illusions of our epoch as much as the men of the Roman republic or medieval nuns or sixteenth-century Calvinist preachers shared those of their respective times and places. If the Cartesian project of setting aside everything we know and value, and starting ab nihilo to build up our views about the world on a certain and incontrovertible base that owes nothing to social conventions, is unworkable, to what extent is it possible for us to free ourselves from our own illusions and work our way to a realistic, or at least a more realistic, worldview? Effective engagement in the political sphere requires not merely that we see how things really stand, but also that we understand, and perhaps even to some extent sympathize with, the way in which others see them, even if they are deluded, and we know that they are deluded. How is it possible to be realistic without getting caught up in the web of powerful fantasies which our society spins around us? How can one get the appropriate imaginative distance from one’s own society, its practices, norms, and conceptions? What is the “appropriate” distance? “Appropriate” in what sense; for what? What are the possibilities, and what the limits of criticism?

raymond geuss, who needs a world view, preface, xv-xvi

Whatever unity our drives, impulses, projects, beliefs, and commitments have is one that we have constructed. This construction is one to which we have a strong tendency and perhaps a deep commitment—a commitment so deep that it generates an illusion of necessity and, perhaps, even of the ontological preexistence of what it seeks—but to what extent it can succeed is always an open question, subject to the vagaries of the world and the accidents of history. So the question should be how the construction should proceed, which constructions are possible and desirable, at what cost, and under what social and individual circumstances. Human life is the story of this recurrent need to orient ourselves toward some imagined unity, and the recurrent failure of our attempts to achieve it by construction. Seeing through this cycle no more prevents the illusion from recurring than eating breakfast prevents the recurrence of hunger in the evening.

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willowJul 5, 2025

similar thing here, like this is a good point to make against new realists but its framed as an internal contradiction for rad realism in general, not like a reminder that geuss got it right the first time.

amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

Such pre-epistemic premises might indeed drive the social analysis of radical realists without being made explicit. The criteria of selection and relevance that shape the lens through which they look at practices of self-justification and epistemic disruption in capitalist, racist and patriarchal contexts remain somewhat unclear. Take their endorsement of prefigurative politics, which is supposed to be ‘less likely to be subject to ideological distortions’ (Rossi, 2019: 647), since prefigurative agents withdraw from the belief structures of societies and create situations in which pervasive forms of distortion are no longer present. Even if this is true, and it might be, a problem with this affirmative stance towards prefigurative strategies is that it does not take sufficient heed of the moral commitments that inspire them. In 1994, when NAFTA was enacted, the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico framed their fight to overcome capitalist oppression as an uprising of dignity, calling it a struggle against ‘la falta de respeto’ that Indigenous people had to endure for centuries and for a right to live as equals in a pluralistic world (see Dussel, 2007; Mignolo, 2002). Or take the Occupy movement, which sprang from widespread outrage over the anti-democratic effects of extreme economic inequality and was motivated by the desire, as John Hammond (2015) puts it, to ‘transform social values to favor human relations over financial transactions’ (289). Radical realists surely believe that such movements fight laudably for important causes. Why not acknowledge this? Otherwise, they contribute only partially to the self-clarification of the prefigurative struggles of our age, neglecting their real motivations and the very point of their practice of resistance. This omission matters since a central ambition of the realist countermovement is to take into account ‘what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances’ (Geuss, 2008…

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willowJul 5, 2025

i'm just extra irked because people looooove saying this shit and it's so obviously already addressed

Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
The Geuss-style realist critique of Rawls’ “ethics first” approach is convincing when applied to a certain style of liberal political theorizing. But when it extends to denying that moral norms have a very real force in human life and power relations, it’s just not plausible.
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Enzo Rossi @enzoreds
Sep 6, 2023
No. The materialist left should leave moralising to the liberals. And btw the impact of Rawlsianism and the wider radlib capture of the putative left has been huge: we now spend way too much time debating our moral intuitions & other wittle feelings instead of talking about power x.com/jacobin/status…
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Zoltán Gábor Szűcs @ZoltnGborSzcs1
Sep 7, 2023
I'm more of a Williamsian-style critic of Rawls's 'applied morality' which is directly related to metaethical debates and it would never try to reject the importance of ethical considerations but I think that your rendering of the Geussian critique is simply wrong.
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Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
I completely agree on Williams, but could you say more re: Geuss? I have Philosophy and Real Politics in mind but I can’t claim to be deeply familiar with the rest of his work.
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Willow @PoliticsWillow
Sep 7, 2023
I mean even in the intro to Philosophy and Real Politics he acknowledges the causal significance of people’s normative conceptions. (Highlight is TL;DR)
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Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
Thanks for the reference, and I think my blanket characterization of Geuss was probably unfair. This is roughly the view of morality Nietzsche articulates in Dawn. But to me this remains a profound philosophical question, and Geuss seems to evade the question of validity here.

https://x.com/DevinGoure/status/1699763743448592746
https://x.com/PoliticsWillow/status/1699835185964150818

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willowJul 5, 2025

gonna start with the messiest thing that doesn't support my thesis because i'm swag like that and its stuck in my teeth.

ulrich, pg 4

It should be mentioned at this juncture that Adorno’s moral scepticism is also tied to the claim that capitalist patterns of production and exchange infiltrate our lives in such a way that moral thought and practice are precarious. It is, as he famously said, impossible to live rightly in the wrong life. However, for him, the blockage of correct moral thought and practice, this epistemic uncertainty is itself a moral wrong since it makes suffering and human coldness persist (see Adorno, 1998a [1966]; Freyenhagen, 2013: 65, 94, 168). Radical realists come close to saying this and yet they cannot say it. But if correct moral reflection is currently impossible or at least hazardous, what they might really be asking for is the emergence of conditions under which it would finally become possible, thereby conceding that morality matters.

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willowJul 5, 2025

i generally actually really like this train of thought, and buy the central negative premise. however, i think it's a bit too optimistic about what morality can do for us "after the revolution", as it were.