Alt Text

willow

dreary.dev

did:plc:hx53snho72xoj7zqt5uice4u

andromorphic angel



this is a side thing but i do think it's cute how the only other time guess uses "powerful fantasies" is when he's talking about rorty's murderous father in the same work. i'd like to think this was intentional
raymond geuss, politics and the imagination, richard rorty at princeton, 159

As the years went by, and we both left Princeton, I am afraid the incipient intellectual and emotional gulf between us got wider, especially after what I saw as Dick’s turn toward ultra-nationalism with the publication of Constructing Our Country. Dick had always been and remained to the end of his life a “liberal” (in the American sense, i.e., a “Social Democrat”): a defender of civil liberties and of the extension of a full set of civic rights to all, a vocal supporter of the labor unions and of programs to improve the conditions of the poor, an enemy of racism, cruelty, arbitrary authority, and social exclusion. On the other hand, I found that he also enjoyed a spot of jokey leftist-baiting when he thought I was adopting knee-jerk positions which he held to be ill-founded. That was all fair enough. I tried not to rise to the bait, and usually succeeded, but this did not contribute to making our relation easier or more comfortable for me. The high (or low, depending on one’s perspective) point of this sort of thing occurred sometime in the 1980s when Dick sent me a postcard from Israel telling me he had just been talking with the Israeli official responsible for organizing targeted assassinations of Arab mayors on the West Bank. He closed by saying he thought this was just what the situation required. I often wondered whether in acting in this provocative way he was treating me as he would have liked to have treated his father, a well-known poet and man of the (relatively) hard Left, who eventually, as Dick put it, “became prey to very powerful fantasies on which he was perfectly willing to act”; Dick had to have him institutionalized after some potentially murderous outbreak. Probably by wondering about this I was trying to convince myself that I had an importance in Dick’s imagination that I surely did not have.

like he's constantly granting things geuss but then being a silly guy about rejecting him. why *this* "because"? of course you're right that the facts do not speak for themselves, and motivations are important, but we can arrive at that evaluation in plenty of ways
1 replies
like this is a fine tension to bring up, but it's also more or less addressed head on by your citation. then again, i'm not too mad about this one because i think the frequency with which the catchphrase is thrown around to be a little off-putting and misleading,
amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

I surmise that the best response for realists would be to stress that they do not deny that a division of labour between moral and epistemic criticisms of ideologies in political theory can be worthwhile and productive (see Aytaç and Rossi, 2023: 1225–1226). Yet this amounts to admitting crucial limits of their approach. This concession sits uneasily with their frequent assertion that the elision of moral ideas is a desirable feature of ideology critique, which is rooted in the sympathies radical realists have for the strong thesis that moral norms tend to be ‘dead politics’, as Geuss (2010) has phrased it: ‘the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future’ (111). Is the point, perhaps, that some prefigurative struggles can escape this grip? How exactly? These are fascinating questions, but reflections on them require the fuel of moral argument to get anywhere at all.
geuss, politics and the imagination, moralism and realpolitik, 42

Ethics is usually dead politics: the hand of a victor in some past conflict reaching out to try to extend its grip to the present and the future. There is nothing inherently wrong with this. Our past is an essential part of what we are, which we ignore at our peril. We could not completely leave it behind even if we wished to do so; but recognition of this necessity gives us no reason to romanticize it. Nothing stops us from making our own moral judgments on our past, on our present way of life, or, proleptically, on future action or its probable outcome, although the further away from present contexts of action we get, the less of a grip our apparatus of moral reflection will give us on the situations we encounter. One should not, however, confuse trying to refine our moral categories with trying to understand what is going on in the world in which we live. There is nothing wrong with cultivating our own moral intuitions, but for them to have any value they must be minimally connected with the cognitive apparatus by which we track the world as it is. There is certainly no guarantee that the fi t between these intuitions, which we in any case have reason to believe are historically highly variable, and the way the world is, will always be smooth and comfortable,so it would behoove us to be on our guard against trusting them too blindly
1 replies
and geuss is less than exactly clear in the passage, stressing the dichotomy too much. i didn't like the aytaç and rossi paper very much for this as well iirc. in any case, if you want geuss' actual view, just ctrl+f for "subordinate"
raymond geuss, morality, culture, and history, 6

Habermas is right to emphasize the importance of 'rank' and 'rank-ordering' in Nietzsche. Nietzsche is a conscious radical anti-egalitarian not just in politics but also in ethics. He explicitly rejects the view that there should be one morality for everyone (JGB §§ 198, 43, 30) . In fact he even holds that it is 'immoral' to apply the principle 'What is fair for one person, is fair for another' (JGB §221). Morality is to be subordinated to the principle of rank-ordering (JGB §§22 1, 219, 228, 257). Habermas is wrong, however, to connect this line of argument with a purported greater nobility of that which is older or more aboriginal.
raymond geuss, history and illusion in politics, 154

On the classic Marxist construction, it is not rational for those who are impoverished and oppressed to want universal tolerance and consensus-based reform rather than violent revolutionary change. Marx's economic analysis may have signal defects and he may have incorrectly identified the major class of oppressed people as 'the international proletariat', but his account of the specious logic of resistance to oppression retains its plausibility. Those who live in wealthy societies with a framework of robust institutions and strong liberal traditions can spend their time discussing the parish-pump politics that take place within that framework and the fine-tuning of the system of individual rights, but the framework is not in place everywhere in the world, and there is no reason to believe it will become universal in the foreseeable future. Even if one had no aspiration beyond that of extending the liberal system into new areas of the world, that would seem to require an ability to take a step back from it and see it in a slightly larger theoretical and empirical context. Such a wider context would be one in which the concept of a 'right' was to play a very derivative and subordinate role.
raymond geuss, outside ethics, 59

I have claimed that the main line of philosophic writing in nineteenth century Central Europe rejects the received modern consensus, and tries to orient thinking about human life and action around a very different set of questions from the ones that preoccupy contemporary ethics. Continental philosophers reject either one or the other (or both) of the two pillars of contemporary ethics. As far as the first pillar is concerned, they take one or another of a variety of weaker or stronger views. Thus, they cast doubt on the centrality of the ethical question, holding the weaker view that knowing “What ought I to do?” is of distinctly subordinate importance in practical life, or that it is not a philosophically significant question. Alternatively, they hold the stronger view that it is actually a deep mistake or a failing to ask that question (at any rate, as a philosophical question).
geuss, philosophy and real politics, 86

Nothing in this book should be taken to imply that no one should ever allow normative considerations of any kind to play any role whatever in deciding how to act politically. After all, even “efficiency” is a kind of normative concept. Equally I have given no reason to think that all moral considerations must be absolutely excluded from politics. Individuals or groups can cultivate their ethical intuitions and exercise their capacities for moral approval or disapproval ad libitum, as long as they do not confuse that with attaining any understanding whatever of the world in which they live, or think that their (clarified) moral intuitions have some special standing as completely adequate guides to political action. Finally, I have no objection to the view that “justice” (in whatever sense) or certain forms of “equality” are political desiderata (among others), as long as this is not construed as an abstract, blanket commitment that overrides all others, and provided particular reasons are given for thinking equality is desirable in some concrete situation. Considerations of fairness, equality, justice, and other virtues might well have a perfectly dignifed, if subordinate, place in various administrative decisions. What I do object to is the claim that they define politics. One result of taking seriously the reflections presented in this book would be that we would give up approaching politics in general by trying, necessarily unsuccessfully, to blank out history, and we would also give up focusing our thinking exclusively on the set of highly peculiar and historically contingent intuitions about “justice” that we happen to and in one contemporary society.

how is this possibly your read! "without any coercion"?? "work out freely"?? why are u like this sob. within your own cited passage he refutes your attribution. like cmon bro we've all read foucault how are you still on this shit
amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

This brings me to a third challenge. It again begins with the question of why it matters that people can work out freely how to structure their social and political lives without getting, as Geuss (2010) frames it, ‘caught up in the web of powerful fantasies which our society spins around us’ (x). Human beings should not be subjected, as this seems to imply, to fabricated realities, but should be lifted to a position from which they can make up their minds, without any coercion, about how society does and can work.
raymond geuss, politics and the imagination, preface, x

Most of the beliefs, attitudes, desires, and values we hold, after all, we have acquired in social contexts in response to individual and institutional forces and pressures of various kinds. There is every reason to believe that I (and we) share the illusions of our epoch as much as the men of the Roman republic or medieval nuns or sixteenth-century Calvinist preachers shared those of their respective times and places. If the Cartesian project of setting aside everything we know and value, and starting ab nihilo to build up our views about the world on a certain and incontrovertible base that owes nothing to social conventions, is unworkable, to what extent is it possible for us to free ourselves from our own illusions and work our way to a realistic, or at least a more realistic, worldview? Effective engagement in the political sphere requires not merely that we see how things really stand, but also that we understand, and perhaps even to some extent sympathize with, the way in which others see them, even if they are deluded, and we know that they are deluded. How is it possible to be realistic without getting caught up in the web of powerful fantasies which our society spins around us? How can one get the appropriate imaginative distance from one’s own society, its practices, norms, and conceptions? What is the “appropriate” distance? “Appropriate” in what sense; for what? What are the possibilities, and what the limits of criticism?
raymond geuss, who needs a world view, preface, xv-xvi

Whatever unity our drives, impulses, projects, beliefs, and commitments have is one that we have constructed. This construction is one to which we have a strong tendency and perhaps a deep commitment—a commitment so deep that it generates an illusion of necessity and, perhaps, even of the ontological preexistence of what it seeks—but to what extent it can succeed is always an open question, subject to the vagaries of the world and the accidents of history. So the question should be how the construction should proceed, which constructions are possible and desirable, at what cost, and under what social and individual circumstances. Human life is the story of this recurrent need to orient ourselves toward some imagined unity, and the recurrent failure of our attempts to achieve it by construction. Seeing through this cycle no more prevents the illusion from recurring than eating breakfast prevents the recurrence of hunger in the evening.
2 replies
similar thing here, like this is a good point to make against new realists but its framed as an internal contradiction for rad realism in general, not like a reminder that geuss got it right the first time.
amadeus ulrich, ideology and suffering, 12

Such pre-epistemic premises might indeed drive the social analysis of radical realists without being made explicit. The criteria of selection and relevance that shape the lens through which they look at practices of self-justification and epistemic disruption in capitalist, racist and patriarchal contexts remain somewhat unclear. Take their endorsement of prefigurative politics, which is supposed to be ‘less likely to be subject to ideological distortions’ (Rossi, 2019: 647), since prefigurative agents withdraw from the belief structures of societies and create situations in which pervasive forms of distortion are no longer present. Even if this is true, and it might be, a problem with this affirmative stance towards prefigurative strategies is that it does not take sufficient heed of the moral commitments that inspire them. In 1994, when NAFTA was enacted, the Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico framed their fight to overcome capitalist oppression as an uprising of dignity, calling it a struggle against ‘la falta de respeto’ that Indigenous people had to endure for centuries and for a right to live as equals in a pluralistic world (see Dussel, 2007; Mignolo, 2002). Or take the Occupy movement, which sprang from widespread outrage over the anti-democratic effects of extreme economic inequality and was motivated by the desire, as John Hammond (2015) puts it, to ‘transform social values to favor human relations over financial transactions’ (289). Radical realists surely believe that such movements fight laudably for important causes. Why not acknowledge this? Otherwise, they contribute only partially to the self-clarification of the prefigurative struggles of our age, neglecting their real motivations and the very point of their practice of resistance. This omission matters since a central ambition of the realist countermovement is to take into account ‘what really does move human beings to act in given circumstances’ (Geuss, 2008…
1 replies
i'm just extra irked because people looooove saying this shit and it's so obviously already addressed
Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
The Geuss-style realist critique of Rawls’ “ethics first” approach is convincing when applied to a certain style of liberal political theorizing. But when it extends to denying that moral norms have a very real force in human life and power relations, it’s just not plausible.
Quote
Enzo Rossi @enzoreds
Sep 6, 2023
No. The materialist left should leave moralising to the liberals. And btw the impact of Rawlsianism and the wider radlib capture of the putative left has been huge: we now spend way too much time debating our moral intuitions & other wittle feelings instead of talking about power x.com/jacobin/status…
.
Zoltán Gábor Szűcs @ZoltnGborSzcs1
Sep 7, 2023
I'm more of a Williamsian-style critic of Rawls's 'applied morality' which is directly related to metaethical debates and it would never try to reject the importance of ethical considerations but I think that your rendering of the Geussian critique is simply wrong.
.
Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
I completely agree on Williams, but could you say more re: Geuss? I have Philosophy and Real Politics in mind but I can’t claim to be deeply familiar with the rest of his work.
.
Willow @PoliticsWillow
Sep 7, 2023
I mean even in the intro to Philosophy and Real Politics he acknowledges the causal significance of people’s normative conceptions. (Highlight is TL;DR)
.
Left Nietzschean @DevinGoure
Sep 7, 2023
Thanks for the reference, and I think my blanket characterization of Geuss was probably unfair. This is roughly the view of morality Nietzsche articulates in Dawn. But to me this remains a profound philosophical question, and Geuss seems to evade the question of validity here.

https://x.com/DevinGoure/status/1699763743448592746
https://x.com/PoliticsWillow/status/1699835185964150818
1 replies

gonna start with the messiest thing that doesn't support my thesis because i'm swag like that and its stuck in my teeth.
ulrich, pg 4

It should be mentioned at this juncture that Adorno’s moral scepticism is also tied to the claim that capitalist patterns of production and exchange infiltrate our lives in such a way that moral thought and practice are precarious. It is, as he famously said, impossible to live rightly in the wrong life. However, for him, the blockage of correct moral thought and practice, this epistemic uncertainty is itself a moral wrong since it makes suffering and human coldness persist (see Adorno, 1998a [1966]; Freyenhagen, 2013: 65, 94, 168). Radical realists come close to saying this and yet they cannot say it. But if correct moral reflection is currently impossible or at least hazardous, what they might really be asking for is the emergence of conditions under which it would finally become possible, thereby conceding that morality matters.
1 replies
i generally actually really like this train of thought, and buy the central negative premise. however, i think it's a bit too optimistic about what morality can do for us "after the revolution", as it were.
1 replies

i'm more pissed the more attention i pay to each citation aaaaaaa
Ideology and suffering: What is realistic about critical theory?
Amadeus Ulrich
Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany
https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:ga24rc5elx4dz6jdk6ztsc3w/post/3lsj5vo5cxc27
https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/14748851251351782
1 replies




best boy
red arrows pointing to an encircled seiji maki from bloom into you on my anilist favorite characters page

https://anilist.co/user/DrearyWillow/favorites


the list grows ever larger (until i purge them again)
App Passwords
Use app passwords to sign in to other Bluesky clients without giving full access to your account or password.
asdfasdfasdf
Created 04/07/2025, 08:51
asdf
Created 25/06/2025, 19:25
asdfasdf
Created 21/06/2025, 07:50
1 replies


she said it to much it became a known phrase to friends of hers i hadn’t met
muen / gorf 6/20/23, 15:19
bluejay Today at 3:19 PM
hes right tho
hes never beating the pathetic man allegations
ever
😭
and thats ok
kekw

i always thought the misquotation was funny
"NIHILISTS - ONE LESS EFFORT TO BE NIHILISTS" written in black marker on a page

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PN_EObmyMXA
LETTERS JOURNAL - ALFONSO 1970 - AUTONOMIA ITALIA
DEATH SENTENCE IS LIFE SENTENCE FOR LETTERS JIORNIAL

WHAT IS IT IS IT IS ON!!!! ON ANDS ON!!

NO WORDS

JUST LETTERS AND MOTHERS INACTION

ANARCHISTNEWS IS NEITHER INJURE THOSE YOUNG PEOPLE
BUT NICELY
AUTONOMIA!! AUTONOMO DYNAMO WASSSSUPP!!! 

SHOUT OUT TO MY HOMIES ACROSS THE DECADES
TOTAL DISTROKTION
https://www.lettersjournal.org/blog/archives/354




when maya likes my posts i think about how i'm rank 4, which is pretty good all things considered
maya likes ranked:

willow 6/24/25 8:48 PM
maya is cute
advancedgooningtipsandtricks.site: 6017,
kasey.cafe: 5426,
dreary.dev: 4713,
futanari.tentacle.expert: 3860,
impishangel.incest.moe: 3333,
vauxknox.bsky.social: 3091,
updowncity.bsky.social: 2850,
rinya.tgirl.gay: 2833,
number-one-warned.rat.mom: 2737,
paizuri.moe: 2615,
jeroba.xyz: 2600,
kxt.pet: 2600,
did:web:juli.ee: 1846,
felina.fish: 1621,
solidbeato.bsky.social: 1260,
homu.fish: 1222,
scar.lt: 1217,
naomii.bsky.social: 1206,
did:web:bsky.mom: 1098,
valeriellustrate.bsky.social: 1096,
pupyp.bsky.social: 956,
chronah.moe.observer: 918,
lunabuna.sisters.moe: 766,
satin.tw: 724





discord diary

willow 12/1/23, 15:42
me when hot girls like my skeets
willow 12/1/23, 16:02
dreary @dreary.bsky.social - 7m
i miss when we traded likes on our posts
what? do i want to actually talk to her? ew no wtf
dreary@dreary.bsky.social • 5m
this genuinely isn't about a singular person (i don't even know if i've consistently had a relationship with that dynamic simultaneously), just a conglomeration of vibes

Marie • 41s @ara.lol
i like your vibe
Dec 1, 2023 at 16:01

she replied too sheeeesh lol

willow 12/1/23, 16:04
willow me when hot girls like my skeets
context:

This is a post by another user.

View in bsky.app




there’s some beautiful irony in the fact that this has been my status for months, but no one has been able to see it
discord status for dreary.dev / willow
🖤 I was never as dead as the time
I stopped screaming
1 replies

i’m not allowed to quote this one but it’s cute and true
https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:355lbopbpckczt672hss2ra4/post/3lhopky5pj22w

poss is by far and a way my favorite thing built on atproto and it's not just because the dev is my girlfriend

it does everything. it is so incredibly useful


FUUUUUUUCK I EVEN HAVE A POST FOR THIS TOO
Gotha posting has caused a shift from people confusing wealth as value to value as wealth lmao
https://x.com/PoliticsWillow/status/1710124310080233593
https://x.com/I_____amakiwi/status/1709991405387399584

this, too, is stolen content that lives in my head rent free (now deleted but i never forget)
screenshot of my twitter archive, containing the post in question

https://x.com/PoliticsWillow/status/1791057179367104532
https://x.com/gracecthdralprk/status/1790775716159619395
https://x.com/PoliticsWillow/status/1593343522790309890
https://x.com/bermanite

Your archive includes all the account data created up to the moment it was generated.
Date generated·December 23, 2024 at 3:29:47 PM GMT-6·Estimated size·152 MB
Home
Account
Tweets
Likes
Direct Messages
Safety
Personalization
Ads
Lists
Moments
Tweets
Tweets
Replies
Retweets
Community Tweets
Willow @PoliticsWillow May 16, 2024
RT @gracecthdralprk
: Arguing with a normal left guy: you are Adolf Hitler
Arguing with a leftcom: you are Siegfried Meisterbürgeresser (obs…
ID1791057179367104532
View on Twitter
Willow @PoliticsWillow Nov 17, 2022
RT @bermanite
: leftcom accounts on their way to make a snarky critique of the gotha program joke when a dsa type says "labor is the source…
ID1593343522790309890
View on Twitter

my hair dries in fun ways
curls

alt text backfill
raymond geuss, history and illusion in politics, pg. 126

This last point about the distinction between the merely instrumentally good and that which is inherently or categorically or absolutely good in itself marks a watershed in political thought which has not, I think, received the attention it descrves. Kant, Max Weber, and Habermas think that this distinction is sharp, and designates a basic and ineluctable feature of human thought and experience. Hegel, Marx, Dewey, and Adorno, on the other hand, think that the distinction is relative and contextual, and that it is a sure sign of a deliciency in a society if this distinction is given too much prominence or taken too seriously. For Marx and Dewey, the distinction is a remnant of a primitive state of society in which slaves did the instrumentally necessary work, and parasitic aristocrats pursued the good for its own sake. The distinction between means and ends, things good in themselves and good for something else, intrinsically good and good for its consequences, or inherent and instrumental value is a distinction one can perfectly well make within and relative to a certain established context of thought or action, but it is neither a fundamental nor an absolute distinction. What is a means in one context, may be an end in another, and in many spheres, especially those in which human activity is freest, the distinction will have only whimsical application. The members of a non-demoralised orchestra may make their living by playing so that to some extent they play for the sake of the money they earn, but the music they make may also have inherent value for them. In a fully developed and free human socicty most human action would be performed both because of the good effects or consequences it would have and because it was experienced as good 'in itself' by the agent.
John Dewey, Democracy and Education, pg. 266

Chapter Nineteen: Labor and Leisure, The Origin of the Opposition.

The isolation of aims and values which we have been considering leads to opposition between them. Probably the most deep-seated antithesis which has shown itself in educational history is that between education in preparation for useful labor and education for a life of leisure. The bare terms "useful labor" and "leisure" confirm the statement already made that the segregation and conflict of values are not self-inclosed, but reflect a division within social life. Were the two functions of gaining a livelihood by work and enjoying in a cultivated way the opportunities of leisure, distributed equally among the different members of a community, it would not occur to any one that there was any conflict of educational agencies and aims involved. It would be self-evident that the question was how education could contribute most effectively to both. And while it might be found that some materials of instruction chiefly accomplished one result and other subject matter the other, it would be evident that care must be taken to secure as much overlapping as conditions permit; that is, the education which had leisure more directly in view should indirectly reinforce as much as possible the efficiency and the enjoyment of work, while that aiming at the latter should produce habits of emotion and intellect which would procure a worthy cultivation of leisure. These general considerations are amply borne out by the historical development of educational philosophy. The separation of liberal education from professional and industrial education goes back to the time of the Greeks, and was formulated expressly on the basis of a division of classes into those who had to labor for a living and those who were relieved from this necessity.
adorno, minima moralia § 84

Timetable . - Few things separate more profoundly the mode of life befitting an intellectual from that of the bourgeois than the fact that the former acknowledges no alternative between work and recreation. Work that need not, to satisfy reality, first inflict on the subject all the evil that it is afterwards to inflict on others, is pleasure even in its despairing effort. Its freedom is the same as that which bourgeois society reserves exclusively for relaxation and, by this regimentation, at once revokes. Conversely, anyone who knows freedom finds all the amusements tolerated by this society unbearable, and apart from his work, which admittedly includes what the bourgeois relegate to non-working hours as 'culture', has no taste for substitute pleasures. Work while you work, play while you play - this is a basic rule of repressive self-discipline. The parents for whom it was a matter of prestige that their children should bring home good reports, were the least disposed to let them read too long in the evening, or make what they took to be any kind of intellectual over-exertion. Through their folly spoke the genius of their class. The doctrine inculcated since Aristotle that moderation is the virtue appropriate to reasonable people, is among other things an attempt to found so securely the socially necessary division of man into functions independent of each other, that it occurs to none of these functions to cross over to the others and remind each other of man. But one could no more imagine Nietzsche in an office, with a secretary minding the telephone in an anteroom, at his desk until five o'clock, than playing golf after the day's work was done. Only a cunning intertwining of pleasure and work leaves real experience still open, under the pressure of society. Such experience is less and less tolerated. Even the so-called intellectual professions are being deprived, through their growing resemblance to business, of all joy.
Atomization is advancing not only between men, but within each individual, between the spheres of his life. No fulfilment may be attached to work, which would otherwise lose its functional modesty in the totality of purposes, no spark of reflection is allowed to fall into leisure time, since it might otherwise leap across to the workaday world and set it on fire. While in their structure work and amusement are becoming increasingly alike, they are at the same time being divided ever more rigorously by invisible demarcation lines. Joy and mind have been expelled equally from both. In each, blank-faced seriousness and pseudo-activity hold sway.

The conception that liberal education, adapted to men in the latter class, is intrinsically higher than the servile training given to the latter class reflected the fact that one class was free and the other servile in its social status. The latter class labored not only for its own subsistence, but also for the means


the masculine urge to rain walk
willow in the rain
1 replies
the pics don’t do it justice but i assure you it is very wet


lives rent free in my head
https://x.com/proleterin/status/1708234042615697824

erin. @proleterin
Suicide is idealist and metaphysical and anti-Marxist. If you're feeling suicidal, just read Mao 
x.com/GuntherMaoist/...
This post is unavailable.
16:35 • 9/30/23 • 66K Views
43 replies • 107 quotes/retweets • 173 likes • 16 bookmarks

wait a minute blackface pinktan goes kinda hard
filter: hue-rotate(290deg) saturate(80%) invert(100%)

hue-rotate my beloved
bluetan but pink on https://pdsls.dev/?kawaii=true