neither rawls nor adorno

i let my mind wander because it was very busy with macintyre thoughts. i listened to music for a bit and eventually found my way to geuss' "virtue and the good life" in outside ethics. fuck he's good.

i don't mind the resurgence of virtue ethics since i think it has far more contextualist potential than its peers and has been somewhat underexplored approach in relatively recent anglophone philosophy, but yea i don't think its gonna cut it as exclusive worldview

it just opens up a lot of fun patterns for thinking about things and i'm able to entertain it a lot more than the alternatives

"it is clear that hume's invocation of sympathy is an invention intended to bridge the gap between any set of reasons which could support unconditional adherence to general and unconditional rules and any set of reasons for action or judgement which could derive from our particular, fluctuating,

circumstance-governed desires, emotions and interests. later on adam smith was to invoke sympathy for precisely the same purpose. but the gap of course is logically unbridgeable, and 'sympathy' as used by hume and smith is the name of a philosophical fiction."

LOL wait fuck i accidentally posted all this in the wrong thread

"we cannot characterize behavior independent of intentions, and we cannot characterize intentions independently of the settings which make those intentions intelligible both to agents themselves and to others"

lmfao i know its freyenhagen's fault but its fucked that reading macintyre is making me admire adorno even more 😭

he's only just begun fleshing out "practices" and already there is buzzing of deficient practices

all of the practices currently on offer are unfortunate, disfiguring, and above all a depressing waste of potential. and its not just like once we start having better practices it will be all well and good, we've been walking a dark path for far too long

and like crucially back on the freyenhagen point, he emphasizes that we don't have a working conception of mankind, which is well and true, but i think if you look at the malformities of our particular virtues you'll see a more harrowingly intricate picture

hm hes talking about practices as potentially evil, so we're getting there but those are certainly not the terms in which i would externally criticize a practice

we STAN an it/its inclusionist king 👑

took a mental break and watching cody ko "the 'visit me' thing is kind of insane i think. if they're friendly enough to say 'visit me' like 'travel to me' that implies that sex will be had. no ex is like 'travel to me, visit me in my city so we can hang out as friends'." clearly he hasn't met me

god i missed juliet so much it was so nice to hear her voice

i like that we’re finding something that works for us, even when from the outside it might look misshapen

a reduction in contact is not a reduction in significance or intimacy

i really do love her

i thought i might make it through whose justice which rationality today too but it’s not looking like that’ll be the case, i’ll just finish after virtue

that was pleasant yay

i talk a lil too much but thats okay

listening to separate people simultaneously verbalizing their actions and ignoring one another is actually incredibly satisfying

*logs into main to follow slices then log out* "i wonder what all these notifs are" oh its just me quoting myself

"in practice the reference implementation is more authoritative than the spec"

github.com/did-method-p... updates.microcosm.blue/3lz7nwvh4zc2u

self-reflection as a form of self-harm

illinois tollway thanks me for my payment, never again

if anything it's a release on a supervenience relation i.e. a denial of the hypostasization of identity into a supervenience relation with reality. the naive materialist inversion gets its appeal from the disruptive impact but nonetheless maintains the connection in too strict and uncontextual a way

i think the core wish is actually still understandable though, it would be a radically different culture and scheme of categorization, which would basically undermine the distinct significance and mystification of identity as such

it is, of course, for that precise reason that the strategy is not viable. but the reductivist simplicity is compelling in the same way that nietzsche's fantasies of unreflective aboriginal masters is

oops

i feel bad for the TAs that had to grade my papers lol

i wonder what pedagogical styles would develop if our institutions took a different shape

i respect simone schweber for her attempts to go against the grain, i'm not sure how successful she was

but then again, i always feel obligated to say that we were the ones that let her down, not the other way around

"twentieth-century social life turns out in key part to be concrete and dramatic re-enactment of eighteenth-century philosophy. and the legitimation of the characteristic institutional forms depends upon a belief that some of the central claims of that earlier philosophy have been vindicated"

machievelli's invocation made me grin, we are so back folks

"not one game is being played, but several, and, if the game metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that moving one's knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across the net" :)

just as unpredictability does not entail inexplicability, so predictability does not entail explicability

taking stock so far, i basically think this is a 10/10 book so far. we're heading into chapter 10 which seems like a turning point and im anxious (/pos) to see what comes next

also i just wanna say, i really enjoy his writing style. it's nice and comfortable and clever. i adored the kautsky reference with "road to power", there are so many subtle things like that

i like the sophrosuni virtue, it comes up in nietzsche every now and again

"there are indeed crucial conflicts in which different virtues appear as making rival and incompatible claims upon us. but our situation is tragic in that we have to recognize the authority of both claims. there is an objective moral order, but

our perceptions of it are such that we cannot bring rival moral truths into complete harmony with each other and yet the acknowledgment of the moral order and of the moral truth makes the kind of choice which a weber or a berlin urges upon us out of the question.

for to choose does not exempt me from the authority of the claim which i chose to go against."