this isn't entirely true, the main thesis is important and it's recontextualizing and drawing together important strands, i just mean to say that the strands themselves are not new, but what else would one expect
the choice between the ethical and the aesthetic is not he choice between good and evil, it is the choice whether or not to choose in terms of good and evil.
"it is clear that hume's invocation of sympathy is an invention intended to bridge the gap between any set of reasons which could support unconditional adherence to general and unconditional rules and any set of reasons for action or judgement which could derive from our particular, fluctuating,
circumstance-governed desires, emotions and interests. later on adam smith was to invoke sympathy for precisely the same purpose. but the gap of course is logically unbridgeable, and 'sympathy' as used by hume and smith is the name of a philosophical fiction."
"twentieth-century social life turns out in key part to be concrete and dramatic re-enactment of eighteenth-century philosophy. and the legitimation of the characteristic institutional forms depends upon a belief that some of the central claims of that earlier philosophy have been vindicated"
"not one game is being played, but several, and, if the game metaphor may be stretched further, the problem about real life is that moving one's knight to QB3 may always be replied to with a lob across the net" :)
taking stock so far, i basically think this is a 10/10 book so far. we're heading into chapter 10 which seems like a turning point and im anxious (/pos) to see what comes next
also i just wanna say, i really enjoy his writing style. it's nice and comfortable and clever. i adored the kautsky reference with "road to power", there are so many subtle things like that
"there are indeed crucial conflicts in which different virtues appear as making rival and incompatible claims upon us. but our situation is tragic in that we have to recognize the authority of both claims. there is an objective moral order, but
our perceptions of it are such that we cannot bring rival moral truths into complete harmony with each other and yet the acknowledgment of the moral order and of the moral truth makes the kind of choice which a weber or a berlin urges upon us out of the question.
"for all our wealth of historical experience, we do not know how to think about victimhood. almost everything one might say would be unfair, self-serving, undignified, untrue, self-deluding, contradictory, or dangerous."
the best religion, therefore, with peace in view, is the one into which one is born - the one most established in one's country and the one which one is most used to. this is not an attempt to disregard the enormous faults of existing ideologies and institutions.
for in what sense can one be said to support an existing order of affairs if one cannot think of anything to say on its behalf except that it is there? it is an act of perfect dissociation, but not necessarily a retreat from the public world.
i am pretty fond of "the conservatism of universal disgust" as a phrase, but politically it's disastrous and the perfection one achieves is the pathetic purity of ideological complacency.
hm i wonder if it's simply the fact that these are somewhat outdated/inapplicable/out of fashion to us now. would snobbery be included in today's ordinary vices?